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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2264
___________
APOLONIO AGUILAR-HERNANDEZ
a.k.a. Hernad Aguikar-Adoloneo,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A200-864-320)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Mirlande Tadal
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 6, 2013
Before: CHAGARES, GARTH and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 8, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Apolonio Aguilar-Hernandez (“Aguilar”) petitions for review of a final order of
removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). For the reasons set out

below, we will deny the petition for review.
Aguilar is a citizen of Mexico. He arrived in the United States in 2005 without
being admitted. On September 26, 2010, local police in New Jersey arrested Aguilar for
driving under the influence of alcohol. The arresting officer, Sergeant Fahr, then called
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and informed them that he had Aguilar in
custody. As a result, ICE issued a detainer on September 26, 2010, and interviewed
Aguilar in prison (where he was being held by local law enforcement) on October 4,
2010. During the interview, Aguilar acknowledged that he was a Mexican citizen and
that he did not have permission to reside in the United States. The next day, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice to appear charging Aguilar with
being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United
States without being admitted.
Before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Aguilar sought to suppress the statements he
made to ICE. He claimed that Sergeant Fahr’s call to ICE was the result of
impermissible racial profiling, and that his statement should be excluded as the fruit of
the poisonous tree. He also claimed that ICE detained him for longer than the relevant
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, allows. The IJ rejected Aguilar’s arguments and ordered
him removed. Aguilar then appealed to the BIA. He reiterated the arguments that he
raised before the IJ, and also contended that the IJ had violated his due process rights by
conducting just a single hearing to evaluate his motion to suppress and to determine
whether he was removable. The BIA dismissed Aguilar’s appeal, and Aguilar filed a
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timely petition for review to this Court.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the decision and analysis of the IJ
while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions. See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562
F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir.2009) We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial
evidence and treat them as “‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. at 251 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
We review legal conclusions de novo. Id.
Aguilar’s primary argument is that Sergeant Fahr, in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights, called ICE (and thus set the immigration-enforcement machinery in
motion) solely because of his race. Therefore, Aguilar continues, based on the
exclusionary rule, his subsequent statements to ICE officials should be suppressed.
Even assuming that Sergeant Fahr’s call to ICE implicates the Fourth Amendment
(which is by no means clear, see generally Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56, 63-64
(1st Cir. 2010)), the BIA did not err in concluding that Aguilar was not entitled to
suppress his statements to ICE. In removal proceedings, the exclusionary rule applies
only “in cases where constitutional violations by immigration officers are ‘widespread’ or
evidence has been obtained as a result of ‘egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained.’” Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259,
272 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984)).
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Aguilar, as the party challenging the legality of the evidence, bears the burden of making
a prima facie case of illegality. See id. at 273. However, he has provided nothing
beyond his own speculation to establish that Sergeant Fahr’s conduct was race-based. 1
This is not sufficient to establish an egregious violation, see Almeida-Amaral v.
Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2006), and the BIA therefore did not err in rejecting
this claim.
Substantial evidence likewise supports the BIA’s conclusion that ICE did not
detain Aguilar for longer than permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Under § 287.7(d), “[u]pon
a determination by [DHS] to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a
criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not
to exceed 48 hours . . . to permit assumption of custody by [DHS].” Here, Aguilar was in
jail for a total of more than 48 hours. Nevertheless (and even assuming, for purposes of
this case, that the exclusionary rule can apply to a violation of § 287.7), § 287.7(d) does
not purport to limit the time that local law enforcement may detain an alien for violating
state criminal laws. Here, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that local law
enforcement detained Aguilar for its own purposes — that is, not based on the
immigration detainer — until October 6, 2010, at which time it released him into DHS
custody. See generally Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 273 (initial burden is on the party
1

In fact, the undisputed evidence establishes that Fahr called ICE after Aguilar could
produce no identification whatsoever; further, Aguilar testified that Fahr might have
understood Aguilar, who apparently speaks English with a heavy accent, to have stated
that he had come from Mexico. Cf. Martinez Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 923 (8th
4

challenging evidence). Aguilar has provided us with no basis to disturb the BIA’s
assessment of these events, and his claim therefore fails. 2
Finally, Aguilar argues that his due process rights were violated because, rather
than holding two separate hearings, the IJ took evidence on both his suppression motion
and the underlying removability charge in one hearing. Aguilar premises this argument
on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), where the Supreme Court held
that, “when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on
the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.”
This claim lacks merit. The concern that animated Simmons — that because of
standing rules, to bring a Fourth Amendment claim a defendant may have to assert
ownership of contraband, which could be fatal to any defense in the underlying action —
is not present here, where Aguilar was not required, for either legal or strategic reasons,
to answer the government’s questions concerning removability. In any event, even
assuming that the IJ erred in combining the hearings in this way, we discern no error in
the BIA’s conclusion that Aguilar was not prejudiced. See, e.g., Delgado–Sobalvarro v.

Cir. 2013) (suggesting that lack of identification can provide reasonable suspicion).
2
To the extent that Aguilar also intends to argue that local law enforcement’s decision to
detain him during this period violated his constitutional rights, he has again failed to
carry his burden. See Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 273. Aguilar has presented no evidence
whatsoever on this issue, and he thus cannot establish that the detention infringed his
constitutional rights. Finally, while Aguilar suggests that it was inappropriate for ICE to
interview him in prison, “the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to
demonstrate a coerced confession.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976).
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Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To establish a violation of due process,
the petitioner[ ] must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural
errors.”). As the BIA explained, even putting aside Aguilar’s hearing testimony, the
evidence in the record (most notably, the Form I-213), was unquestionably sufficient to
establish his removability. See Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 618 F.3d 647, 656-57 (7th
Cir. 2010). Thus, any error here could not have caused substantial prejudice. See United
v. Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d 795, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding violation of Simmons
rule harmless where improperly admitted evidence was duplicative). 3
Accordingly, we will deny Aguilar’s petition for review.
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To the extent that Aguilar argues that his due process claim can succeed without a
showing of prejudice, we reject his argument. While we have held that “violations of
regulations promulgated to protect fundamental statutory or constitutional rights need not
be accompanied by a showing of prejudice to warrant judicial relief,” Leslie v. Att’y
Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2010), Aguilar has not identified any regulation that the
IJ violated here.
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